Impact of Economic, Political, and Socio-Demographic Factors on the Parliamentary Election Outcomes in Central and Eastern European Countries by Zhelo, Inessa
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
ON THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OUTCOMES
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
North Dakota State University
of Agriculture and Applied Science
By
Inessa Zhelo
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Major Department:
Agribusiness and Applied Economics
November 2008
Fargo, North Dakota

in
ABSTRACT
Zhelo,  Inessa;  M.S.;  Department of Agribusiness and Applied  Economics;  College of
Agriculture,  Food  Systems,  and Natural  Resources; North  Dakota State  University;
November 2008.  Impact of Economic,  Political, and  Socio-Demographic  Factors on
the  Parliamentary Election Outcomes  in Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries.
Major Professor:  Dr.  Dragan Miljkovic.
This study determines how economic,  political,  and  socio-demographic  factors
impact the parliamentary election outcomes  in central  and  eastern  European  countries
in transition period. A one-way fixed-effect method has been applied to analyze two
main economic models. The dependent variables are share of the Western-oriented
and traditional-oriented parties. Data of sixteen countries have been used  in the thesis.
According to the results of this study,  it  is possible to  conclude that outcomes
of parliamentary elections  in central and eastern  European  countries depended  on
political and  socio-demographic  factors  from  I 990-2001.  Factors  such  as  loans,
received  from  the  United  States,  per capita in the pre-election  year,  as a measure  of
external  pressure,  and  share of agriculture  in GDP,  as a measure of country`s  level  of
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CHAPTER I. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Introduction
In the  1980s, socialist countries in eastern Europe experienced an economic crisis
with diminished production, high unemployment, and inflation.   Scientific advancements
had not been applied to production systems to increase either the quantitative or the
qualitative characteristics of the economies.   Therefore, the economic development of the
cc)untries in central and eastern Europe was based on extensive factors instead of
intensive factors. The quantitative characteristics of production led to a low cost
efficiency in these countries.
After the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke up in the  1990s, the new states in
central and eastern Europe began their transition towards open market economic systems.
Under the previous planned economic systems, governments owned all the property,
fixed prices for goods, and determined production plans, whereas the new western-
orientated systems created market economies characterized by private property for
citizens, prices determined by forces of demand and supply, and limited government
control over production.
The reforms included both economic and political changes. During the transition
period, the countries of central and eastern Europe rebuilt their political and legal systems
by moving from authoritarian management systems to parliamentary democracies.  Instead
of one communist party, a variety of parties appeared in each country, and people
welcomed the opportunity to elect their own party members for their parliaments. The
large number of parties reflected the development of democracy in these countries.
These new democracies hoped to gain access to international markets and funds
that were necessary for instituting economic reforms. Therefore, economic development
became dependent on the implementation of reforms as well as the technical and financial
help developing countries could gain from developed countries.   However, implementing
reforms hastily actually increased the political and economic crisis.  In the article, "The
•Free Market'  Social Catastrophe," Nick Beams determined that the average level of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in central and eastern Europe in  1997 was almost  12
percent less than in  1990. Thus, the economic situations of many of the countries were far
below the average. In  1997, the GDPs of Latvia and Lithuania equaled only 59 percent of
their  1990 GDPs.  Russia and Ukraine were in the worst situation; their  1997  GDP
accounted for only 55  percent of the  1990 GDPs (Beams,1999).   This was  a very hard
period of time for the post-socialist countries. According to Beams, the transition period
in the countries of central and eastern Europe was similar to the Great Depression in the
United State.
Description of the Study
All parties were divided into two significant groups based on their preferred
economic systems: those who supported the new market economy (i.e„ Western) and
those who supported the old centrally planned economy (i.e., traditional).
The percentage of votes for Western-oriented parties and traditional-oriented
parties characterized the outcome of the elections in central and eastern European
countries.  It is assumed that four factors play major roles in determining the outcomes of
the elections:  (1) loans, received from the United State( loans) per capita in the pre-
election year, as a measure of external pressure before election; (2) GDP per capita during
the election year, as a measure of the size of the economy; (3) share of the agriculture in
GDP, as a measure of country development; (4) and fertility in the pre-election year, as a
measure of socio-demographics in population.
In this study, we focused on the outcomes of parliamentary elections in the central
and eastern Europe countries during the transition period (1990-2001 ). The voting data in
the assembly elections of sixteen post-socialist countries were obtained from Bugajski
(2002) and from the University of Essex (2001).  The parties in the election process were
divided into  "Western"  and "traditional"  parties according to their economic platforms.
The data for  loans per capita were collected from the US Agency for International
Development (USAID)(2006) document known as the "Greenbook" report. Nominal
GDP per capita was calculated in current US dollars from nominal GDP and population
data received from DDP Quick Query database of the World Bank Group (2006).
Agriculture and fertility information were gained from the same World Bank Group
database. The purpose of the study was to analyze the impact of economic and socio-
demographic factors on the parliamentary elections during the transition period ( 1990-
2001) in sixteen central and eastern Europe countries because the resulting parliaments
determined the policies for economic development.
The methodology in this study used two fixed-effect models to estimate how each
of the exogenous factors impacted the election outcomes. Because a collinearity problem
could occur between independent variables, GDP per capita and share of agriculture were
applied in the two different models.
Problem Statement and Hypothesis
To enable economists to successfully predict election outcomes in the future, this
study has been designed to investigate the extent to which economic, political, and socio-
demographic factors impact election outcomes.   Data has been gathered from GDP per
capita, agriculture,   loans per capita, and the fertility rate of sixteen central and eastern
European countries during the period of transition to democracy. The goals of this
research include the following:
1 . To investigate the economic, political, and socio-demographic factors that impact
election outcomes in economies in transition in central and eastern European countries.
2. To identify how such factors affect the success of Western-oriented and traditional-
oriented parties in parliamentary elections.
This research investigated existing literature related to the importance of the
factors of voting, rate of fertility, IMF loans, personal income, and percentage of
employment in agriculture. At the same time, we examined the importance of external
pressure on the election outcomes and the factors of share of agriculture in GDP and GDP
per capita. Results from this study suggested a new approach to the economic and
political variables that influence voting in countries (economies in transition)  in central
and eastern Europe.  Four assumptions underly this study:  (I) in countries with higher
levels of GDP per capita (wealthier), more people vote for Western parties, and in
countries with lower levels of GDP per capita , more people choose traditional  parties;  (2)
higher rates of fertility have a positive impact on the voting percentage for traditional
parties and lower fertility rates positively affect the voting percentage for Western parties;
(3) developed countries give fewer  loans per capita to developing countries before an
election to influence the outcome of the election to favor Western candidates  (4) countries
with more private farmers tend to elect Western candidates.
Outline
This thesis includes three additional sections. Chapter 11 describes the literature
related to voting outcomes as well as the influence of the economic, political, and socio-
demographic factors on the election results. Chapter Ill presents the models and the
methodology of the study. Chapter IV describes the results of the estimated empirical
models.
CHAPTER 11. LITERATURn REvlnw
Introduction
The transition period for central and eastern European countries included the
appearance of many different political parties, which fought for the largest number of
seats in the legislative bodies. After the previous monopoly of one communist party,
people welcomed the new opportunity to choose among a variety of candidates as they
considered which one represented their preferred policies for social and economic
development. Most of the nations of central and eastern Europe decided to build market
economies based on specific socio-demographic, economic, and political reasons.
Therefore, this section examines research attempts to identify the factors that contributed
to the election outcomes.
Literature Review
Many researchers have analyzed voting in developed countries, especially in the
US (e.g., Kramer  1971, Lepper  1974, Tufte  1975, Fiorina  1978, Hibbs  1982,   Erikson
1988, Fair  1990, Alesina et al.1993,   Chappell et al.1993,   Akarca and Andrianacos,
2006).  However, that literature does not apply to developing countries because of the
differences between the political systems; central and eastern European countries have
multiparty political systems, whereas the United States has a two-party system for
elections. Therefore, we concentrated our attention on the literature that analyzed
countries in central and eastern Europe.
Literature examining the voting in developing countries is sparse. The first one
hundred and one articles about the voting behavior in post-communist countries (from
1990`2000) were reviewed by Tucker (2002). Almost half of the articles focused ctn
election outcomes in Russia.   Forty-nine of the articles used a quantitative method of
database analysis.   The majority of the literature (eighty eight articles) concentrated on
the election consequences. The author divided the literature into three groups according to
the factors contributing to the voting outcomes: (i) "definite elections," (2) "political
parties," and (3) "thematic question," which includes the influence of economic
conditions on the voting.
Scholars chose different dependent and independent variables to understand the
impact of various factors on the election outcomes and voting for countries in the
transition period. Alexander Pacek (1994) conducted one of the first serious econometric
studies about the post-communist European countries during the transition. His work
views four elections in Poland, Bulgaria, and the Czechoslovak Republic, which includes
one presidential and three legislative elections. As dependent variables, he employed the
election turnout and the election result of either a party or a candidate. Pacek divided the
parties into two groups, one that supported economic reforms and one that did not. The
last group included left-wing and right-wing parties that were criticized for holding
economic reforms. He investigated each party in both groups= Additioilally, he found that
the unemployment rates were salient indicators of the voting in these countries.  He argued
that worsening economic conditions lead to decreases in election turnouts. The author
alleges that a high level of unemployment causes voters to change their preferences and
begin to vote for traditional or extremist parties, instead of pro-reform parties.
Janice Bell (1997) employed results of the Polish presidential and parliamentary
elections in  1990-1995 to argue a relationship exists between voting and the economy
(unemployment, per capita income in regions). Bell separated the presidential and
parliamentary candidates according to their positions, which revealed an opportunity to
receive different signs for the independent variables based on the political platforms of
these candidates. Using dependent variable as share of votes for each presidential
candidate or parliamentary party that passed a five percent threshold, the author identified
a visible influence from economic conditions in each of the four Polish elections,
especially between voting and the rate of unemployment.
Gibson (1995) also examined the  1993 parliamentary elections in Poland with
share of votes for each presidential candidate or parliamentary party.  His regression
analysis suggested that "stronger economic growth since the spring of 1992, lower
unemployment, and greater proportion of the work force in the private non-farm sector
would all have increased the support of the pro-reform party," but he clarified that each
factor individually had not influenced the polls' voting opinion. The model of powers and
Cox.  (1997) consists of four equations for the same election that applied the  following
dependent variables:  "blame communist system", "blame first-wave reformers'`, "changes
in personal living situation",   and "economic reform's satisfaction" They derived the
opposite conclusion: an attenuate relationship exists between the factors of individual
income and occupation and the results of the Polish National Election.
Fidrmuc (2000) separated parties into four groups based on their platforms (i.e.,
left wing, right wing, nationalist, and minority parties), but analyzed the voting share of
each individual party. The author hypothesized that voting in Hungary, Slovakia, Poland`
and the Czech Republic was affected by economic conditions during the election periods
and by prospects of future development. For regression analysis, Fidrmuc used regional
economic factors (unemployment rate, size of wage, share of entrepreneurs in the
population, and percentage of employment in the agriculture and industry) and found that
the electorate voted according to their expectations about the future but were not affected
by the current situation in the country. The unemployment impact, in most cases, was
significant. Entrepreneurs affected the pro-Western parties positively, so a higher share of
entrepreneurs in the population increased voting for the pro-reform parties. However, the
regression results with the rates of employment in industry and agriculture were not
consistent, nor was a clear relationship evident between wages and voting.
In addition to Pacek ( 1994), Harper (2000) also used a vote choice to analyze
voting behaviors in the parliamentary elections in Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.  He
investigated the role of economic hardship in the victories of ex-communist parties and in
the defeats of pro-reform incumbent parties in the elections. Results indicated that
economic indices (unemployment, personal financial situation) did not significantly affect
the results in these countries.
Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003) claimed that only constituencies in stable, developed
countries can expect to define their party platforms according to past economic activity.
This type of campaign strategy is not effective in developing countries.  At the beginning
of the transition period, the economic variables of socio-economic status (type of job)`
personal income, unemployment rate, and wage were insignificant. From  1993-1996,
economic variables became important for voting behavior.
An analysis of the existing literature provides the opportunity to identify the most
appropriate endogenous variables for models in this paper. To begin, we took Pacek' s
(1994) basic approach and applied it as a dependent variable, but we divided the parties
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into different groups according to their economic platforms (i.e., Western or tradltional).
We then summarized the voting percentage for each party in one group, resulting in two
voting summations for two groups. In addition, the existing literature does not clearly
identify which economic variables had the greatest effect on voting results.   Therefore,
the first model in our current study included the explanatory variable of annual GDP
growth per capita because we believe the macroeconomic factors, as a measure of
economic strength, are more appropriately related to the parliamentary elections in post-
communist countries.
The transition was characterized by farmer development based on privatization,
instead of collective farms. The new class was interested in private property and further
market transformation; therefore, a large body of literature links agriculture and economic
development. Macours and Johan (2000) investigated the factors that affected the
agricultural output in transition countries of central and eastern Europe.  Laitner (2000)
and Gollin et al. (2002) argued that declines in agriculture led to more development in the
countries.
To investigate the influence of agriculture on voting, scholars use different
variables, but most of them are socio-demographic parameters. Fidrmuc (2000) and
Tucker (2004) applied the percentage of population employed in agriculture; Jackson et
al. (1999) and Gibson and Cielecka (1995) used the same variable but in state and private
farms. Doyle and Walsh (2007) included percentage of unemployment in agriculture to
show its insignificant effect on the voting. Powers and Cox (1997) controlled farmers as a
kind of occupation and believed that they need to be less interested in the reform
implementation. The result of the analysis became insignificant in their model.  In our
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research models, we used the percentage of agriculture share in GDP for each country as
explanatory variables because it reflects the privatization process and development in
each country.
Scholars have debated the role played by loans in development during the
transition period. Most of the research has focused on International Monetary Fund (IMF)
aid as researchers investigated the impact of loans on the different aspects of
development, such as economic, social, and political.   However, very few studies have
investigated possible links between political factors and loan allotment.   This section
reviews what has been done to date.
Drehel and Vaubel (2001 ) suggested that IMF lending to democratic countries is
greater in pre-election and post-election years because the Fund decreases credit during
election years to push governments into adopting new policies and programs.   A
comparison statistics of twenty-nine countries supported their claim.
Vreeland ( 1999) argued that "sovereignty penalties" were lower for countries with
longer IMF credit histories, but the costs of penalties were the highest before the election.
He showed that "debt service" and "lagged election" significantly influenced whether or
not a country signed an agreement with the IMF, thus linking higher "debt service" to
increased desire for a credit agreement. The optimal times for governments to make
agreements are during the early election and post-election periods.
Bird and Rowlands (2003) believe that the size of the gap between the conditions
of the Fund and policies of a country determined the cost of credit for various countries.
In their opinion, governments with Western orientation had a higher probability of
receiving credit.  On the other hand, less-influential countries felt more pressure to accept
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IMF conditions, than more influential ones. Andersen et al's work (2006) also
demonstrated that countries with political positions similar to the US had greater
opportunities to receive aid. Their research was based on data collected by Tracker
( 1999), which indicated that the political positions of post-socialist countries influenced
the lending decisions of the IMF.
Miljkovic (2008) analyzed the impact of IMF loans as external pressure from
developed countries on transitioning economies (countries). The author suggested that
IMF loans negatively impacted the development of transitioning ecoilomies` even though
the World Bank and the IMF did not intend to do so (according to the Washington
Consensus). This conclusion was based on the organizational portfolio theory.
Because the existing literature investigated only the conditions of the loan
agreements with the IMF as well as the importance of the size of IMF loans for the
countries' budgets, we followed a new approach for interpretation of loans based on the
work of Miljkovic (2008).   In our model, we included quantity of the receiving loans as
an independent variable to characterize the pressure from developed countries to
encourage countries to choose Western-orientated reforms.
In addition to economic and political factors, we investigated socio-demographic
factors in election outcomes in central and eastern European countries during the
transition period. Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003) investigated socio-demographic
characteristics of the electorate in terms of age, gender, marital status, education, and
number of children. They found that a consistent relationship between voting preference
and ideology,  education,  and age.  Chase (1996)  found decreasing fertility rate  in first
three transition years in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The article also reports that
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women with higher earnings prefer to have less children in the transition period of
countries.   H.  Kohler and I.Kohler (2002) investigated the decreasing  fertility rates  in
Russia in  1990 from the macro-and micro-points of view.  They indicated that a positive
relationship existed between the "labor market crisis" and fertility on the individual  level:
•`Women or couples who are themselves affected by labor market crisis often had a higher
probability of having another child in the period  1994-1996 than women/couples who
were less affected by such crisis" (p.233).   This tendency suggested that people in more
developed countries tend to have fewer children.   This claim was also made by Dyson and
Murphy ( 1985),  Watkins (1987),  Galor and Weil (1996), Bongaarts (1999),  Blackburn
and Cipriani (2002), Doepke (2004), and Galor (2006), which analyzed demographical
factors in the United State beside some developing countries. Therefore, the conclusion
can be drawn that families with many children support traditional parties more because
traditional government aid large families.  This current study uses fertility in the models
as an independent variable to reflect the socio-demographic situation.
Review of existing literature suggests that the voting, party system, IMF loans,
share of agriculture in GDP, personal income, and fertility rate in women are significantly
important in economies of countries in transition. Our research separated voting outcomes
into two categories:  Western and traditional.   We used new explanatory variables to
explain the outcomes.   For example, we used US  loans per capita to measure the external
pressure on the transition countries; we used share of agriculture in GDP to reflect a new
process in the country's economy; and we used GDP per capita to show the economic
strength of each transition country.
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CHAPTER Ill. METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter contains three sections. The first section explains our approach to
categorizing the existing parties within each country. The second section explains the two
models used in our analysis. The third section describes the data applied in each model
Categorization
All parties in the sixteen investigated countries were divided  into two main groups
according to their economic platforms:  Western-oriented and traditional-oriented parties.
The Western-oriented parties aimed to build a market economy. The traditional parties
aimed to establish planned economies`   Small parties earning one percent or less of the
voting share were placed in a third category (Other). Additionally, this category included
the voting against all candidates. The general summation of election voting also includes
the voting share for the independent candidates, which are not involved in any mentioned
groups. The information was taken from the web-sites of the parties in each country and
Bugajski (2002). When the web-site of the parties did not provide information in English,
we found the economic platforms of the parties through other sources such as media
articles about the parties and political reviews.
We summarized the total voting shares of the parties in each group and used tlle
summations as dependent variables in the equations.   The results showed that Lithuania,
Moldova, and Slovenia did not contain any traditional-oriented parties; the rest of the
countries contained a few (1-4) traditional parties, specifically communist and socialist
parties.  All countries became more Western-oriented in  1990-2001  (Table 3.1 ).
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Table 3. I . The number of Western-oriented and traditional-oriented parties
in the transition period
Name of country General numbers ofpartiesandcoalitions
Number of parties
Western- Traditional-
oriented orLented
Albania 15 12 3
Bosnla-Herzegovina
20 19 1
Bulgaria 29 26 3
Croatla 24 21 3
Czech Republic 23 19 4
Estonia 27 24 3
Hungary 14 12 2
Latvia 20 18 2
Lithuania 26 26 0
Moldova 18 18 0
Poland 32 31 1
Romania 27 24 3
Russia 32 29 3
Slovakia 20 17 3
Slovenia 19 19 0
Ukraine 20 18 2
Appendix A presents the summarized shares of traditional and Western parties`
indicating the biggest share of voting for the traditional parties appeared in Albania (i.e.,
56.2 percent in  1991  and 55.2 percent in  1997).  The countries exhibited different
tendencies jn  voting for traditional parties;  in some countries, the share of the traditional
parties increased after  1995  (Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina), but others demonstrated the opposite tendency:   the share of traditional
parties decreased after  1995  (the Czech Republic,  Bulgaria).
There were two groups placed into a third category named "Other": independent
candidates and people who voted against all candidates.. Independent candidates earned
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significant percentages in the following countries:  Estonia -4.3  % (1992),  Latvia -10.3
% (1990), Romania -3. i  % (1990), Moldova -4 % (1998), Ukraine -66.5 % (1994),
Croatia -11.8 % (1992). Voting against all appeared in Ukraine in  1998  (5.3%), and in
Russia in  1993  (4.2%),1995  (2.8%), and  1999 (3.3%).
For countries with two different election levels, we analyzed the federal elections,
which involved parties reflecting the voting in the whole country, not in the separate
parts. For instance, national elections were held for the Federal Assembly in Slovakia and
the Czech Republic, and for the National Assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For countries
with two Chambers in the Assembly, we analyzed the Chamber that best represented the
national:   the Sejm in Poland; the Chamber of Nations (1990), the Federal Assembly
(1992), and the Chamber of Deputies (1996,1998) in the Czech Republic;  the National
Council (1990) and the Chamber of Nations of the Federal Assembly (1992) in Slovakia;
the Grand National Assembly (1990) in Bulgaria; the Senate in Romania; and the House
of Representatives in Croatia.
Models
The main goal of this study was to understand how economics affected political
outcomes in central and eastern European countries from  1990-2001.  Panel data was used
in the study;   Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1997) explained that panel data "includes a sample
of individuals (households, firms, cities, etc.) over a period of time" (p.250).  We used
data from sixteen countries during the election or pre-election periods (from three to five).
Pindyck and Rubinfeld explained three advantages of using panel data:   (1) allows
separate estimations of technological effects and scale economies effect, (2) provides a
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large volume of data for analysis, and (3) decreases the likelihood of problems associated
with omitted factors (p.250).
Typically, political and economic rela.tionships are studied by using the Ordinary
Least Squire (OLS) method, which is also useful for panel data.   For example,   Fidrmuc
(1999) used OLS to analyze the relationship between election outcomes and "\'oter`s
support of economic reforms" (p.3).   He also employed only data only from election years
and analyzed every each country separately. His approach would not work in this study
because all countries will be analyzed together. Appropriate models for panel data are
fixed-effect and random-effect models.   Fixed-effect models include dummy variables
that allow constant intercepts "over time and over individuals" (Pindyck and Rubinfeld`
1997, p.253). The fixed-effect model has the following form:
Y,[=  CL+Pxit+Y2 D2t+  y3 D3t  +  . . .+YN DNt +8 it,
where a - intercept,
P, y2` y3, yN -Slopes for the different variables,
X,t - independent variables in t period of time,
Y„ -dependent variables in t period of time,
DNt -dummy varjables for i-the countries,   i= 2, 3 ,..., N, otherwise DNt= 0,
c ,t - error term.
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1997) explain two possible problems associated with this
type of model. First,  dummy variables do not explain the causes of regression changes
through time and individuals.  Second, the degree of freedom is decreased (p.253).
The random-effect model applies an additional error component, which provides
additional information about the model. The model is presented by the following form:
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Y,,- a+PX,t+ c lt
c 1'-  u,+V'+wit,
where a - intercept,
P - slope for the different independent variables,
X,t -independent variables in t period of time,
Y„ - dependent variables in t period of time,
€ ,t - error term,
u, - cross-section error component for i-individuals,
v, -  time-section error component for i-individuals,
w„  -combined error component for i-individuals in t period of time.
According to Kennedy (1996), fixed-and random-effect models are used when
"the number of cross-sectional units is large and number of the time periods over which
those units are observed is small" (p.222).   In his opinion, the random fixed-effect model
is employed when data include a large population. Our data were gathered from six
variables in three to five   elections in sixteen countries.   Therefore, the fixed-effect model
was more appropriate for the small population in our study.
We added (N-1 ) dummy variables in the model and omitted one of them to
exclude the collinearity between exogenous factors.  We used a one-way fixed-effect
model with proxy variables only for countries without dummy variables for time. Time
values are different for each country according to the various election years.
We investigated two basic models with two dependent variables:  share of voting
for Western-oriented and traditional parties. Each model was run twice with different sets
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of the independent variables. The first set included loans, fertility, and GDP. The second
set included loans, fertility, and agriculture.   The models are given below.
Model  1
1.  SWP=f (Lag(Loans), GDP,  Lag(Fertility), D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6,  D8,  D9` Dl 0,  Dl 1 `
D12,  D13,  D14,  D15,  D16).
2. SWP=f (Lag(Loans), Lag(Agriculture), Lag(Fertility), Dl , D2, D3` D4, D5, D6, D8`
D9,  D10,  Dll,  D12,  D13,  D14,  D15,  D16).
Model 2
1.  STP= f (Lag(Loans), GDP, Lag(Fertility), D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D8, D9, Dlo, Dll,
D12,  D13,  D14,  D15,  D16).
2. STP=f (Lag(Loans), Lag(Agriculture), Lag(Fertility), D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D8,
D9,  D10,  Dl 1,  D12,  D13,  D14,  D15,  D16).
The models include the following variables:
STP -share of the traditional oriented parties in the parliamentary election, %,
SWP -share of the Western oriented parties in the parliamentary election, %,
Lag(Agriculture) -share of agriculture in GDP in pre-election year, %,
Lag(Fertility) - birth per woman in pre-election year, units,
GDP - nominal GDP per capita in election year, current US S,
Lag(Loans) -loans and grants, received from the US, per capita in pre-election year.
current US  S,
D1  -dummy variable of Estonia,
D2  - dummy variable of Latvia,
D3 - dummy variable of Lithuania,
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D4-dummy variable of poland,
D5-dummy variable of the Czech Republic,
D6 - dummy variable of Slovakia,
D7 - dummy variable of Albania,
D8-dummy variable of Bulgaria,
D9- dummy variable of Romania,
D 10 - dummy variable of Moldova,
D I 1 - dummy variable of Ukraine,
D 12- dummy variable of Russia,
D 13-dummy variable of Hungary,
D 14-dummy variable of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
D 15-dummy variable of Croatia,
D 16 - dummy variable of Slovenia. In both models, proxy variable D7 - Albania was
omitted to avoid a multicollinearity problem in the equations.   Albania was a basic to
which other proxies will be compared.
Loans and fertility are included in each set of independent variables. Our study
investigated four hypothesis. First, we assumed that higher ratings of fertility had a
positive impact on the voting percentage for traditional parties because traditional parties
provided more support for families with less income. Respectively, fertility is negatively
related to the share of the Western-oriented voting because such parties offer fewer social
programs for poor people.
Second, the economic variable,  loans per capita, measured the external pressure
that occurred before the election. Each country was given fewer  loans per capita in the
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pre-election year to encourage the government of the country to choose a Western-
oriented policy. Fewer loans increased economic pressure and led to increases in
Western-oriented voting. The opposite occurred with traditional voters:   fewer loans and
grants led to fewer votes for socialists and communists.
Third, the model included economic explanatory variables such as GDP per
capita.   We assumed that more people in richer countries (i.e., higher level of GDP per
capita) vote for Western-oriented parties.   We also assumed the opposite for traditional
voting:   poor people prefer to vote for traditional platforms that offer more social
programs.
Fourth, the model included one additional variable: agriculture.   We assumed that
agriculture was positively related to Western-oriented voting because new farmers are
interested in private property and privatization.   Consequently, we assumed that
increasing the share of agriculture in GDP leads to increases in Western-oriented voting,
and vice versa.
During the process of investigating the models, we tried to apply additional
variables: percentage of population with tertiary education,life expectancy, and external
debt. However, a large number of missing values did not allow us to use external debt as
an explanatory variable of external pressure. Education and life expectancy were not
included in the models because they were not statistically significant.
Data
For the econometric analysis of this research, we used data from the transition
period between  1990-2001.  This period was the hardest time for the post-communist
countries because they were rebuilding their economies and choosing methods for
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development. In the model, we included the countries of central and eastern Europe:
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Albania, Bulgaria,
Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and
Slovenia.
In a one-way fixed-effect model, as a dependent variable, we applied a summation
of the share of voting in the parliamentary elections for the Western-oriented parties and
traditional ones. The voting percentage of the parliamentary elections in the election years
for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania,
Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Hungary was obtained from the website of the University
of Essex, Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-
Communist Europe. The share of voting for the rest of countries (Albania, Croatia` and
Bosnia-Herzegovina) was obtained from Bugaj ski (2002).
The parties were divided into two categories according to their future economic
goals. Parties supporting the transition to the market economy were identifled as Western-
oriented. Parties were identified as traditional if they supported socialist and communist
policies of communal ownership of property and means of production.   Socialists believe
that communism is the last stage of the process of implementing socialism because
communism provides social welfare. However, we encountered problems during the
separating process because most of the parties had changed their positions during the ten
years between the transition period and our study.   For example, some parties had joined
a coalition, and some had left one coalition to join another. Therefore, some inaccuracies
may appear due to variations in the platforms of some parties.
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In the study, two models with different explanatory variables were analyzed.  The
first model consisted of nominal GDP per capita, fertility rate, and loans per capita. The
second one included agriculture, loans per capita, and fertility rate. Both models were run
twice with different endogenous variables:  share of voting for Western parties and share
of voting for traditional parties.  Loans  per capita, in current US dollars, were obtained
from a report, known as  The Greenbook,   from the US Agency for International
Development (USAID).   The Greenbook provides information about US aid to foreign
countries for a fiscal year. The other independent variables were the nominal GDP per
capita calculated from nominal GDP in current US dollars and the population obtained
from the DDP Quick Query database of the World Bank Group (2006). According to the
notes of the World Bank Group, "GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making
deductions for depreciation" (2006).  Additionally, the variable total population `.is based
on the facto definition of population, which counts all residents of legal  status or
citizenship -except for refugees not permanently in the country of asylum` who are
generally considered part of the population" (2006).
Agriculture and fertility were used from the same database of the World Bank
(2006).   Fertility rate "represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if
she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with
current age-specific fertility rates" (World Bank, 2006).  In the other model, instead of
GDP per capita, we included agriculture as defined as a share of GDP:  "Agriculture
corresponds to  ISIC  divisions  1-5  and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing,  as well as
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cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector
after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs" (World Bank, 2006).
Missing data for fertility, agriculture, nominal GDP per capita was calculated as
an average value for the each country. Respectively, missing values of loans per capita
equals zero.    The simple statistics calculated from the data are presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2.  Simple statistics of the analyzed variables
Variables Mean StandardDeviation Sun Minimum Maximum
Agriculture 14.02 10.27 813.00 3.00 52.00
Fertility 1.58 0.57 91.40 1.00 3.00
GDP 2822.00 2187.00 163649.00 216.93 10280.00
Loans 14.73 35.52 854.12 0.00 203.49
STP 10.0 13.8 581.7 0.0 56.2
SWP 82.3 16.5 4773.0 15.9 100.0
The analysis of the mean, maximum, and minimum of the value of the variables
presents a sensible fluctuation between the minimum and maximum values of most of the
variables, including such variables as agriculture, GDP per capita, STP, SWP, and loans
per capita.
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter contains the results of the econometric analysis of the models
described in the previous chapter. First, we demonstrate that multicollinearity is not a
problem with the data.   Second, we present the results from both models, the Western-
oriented parties and the traditional-oriented parties, based on the econometric analysis in
the SAS program.
Results
Several factors can affect the econometric analysis, so we must first test for
multicollinearity, which is a correlation between independent variables.   Multicollinearity
creates the situation in which a change in one explanatory variable causes changes in
another independent variable; together, these problems can change a dependent variable.
One of the methods to observe multicollineaity is to analyze the collinearity matrix of the
predicted values.  A coefficient equal to 0.7 or greater reflects a collinearity problem in the
equation.   According to the correlation coefficients jn Table 4.1, the two variables, GDP
per capita and agriculture, correlate with each other.
Table 4. I . Multicollinearity diagnostic of variables
Variables Agriculture Fertility GDP Loans
Agriculture 1.0000 0.5891 -0.6252 0.2383
Fertility 0.5891 1.0000 -0.4229 0.0745
GDP -0.6252 -0.4229 I.0000 -0.2621
Loans 0.2383 0.0745 -0.2621 I.0000
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Their correlation coefficient equals -0.6252, so a negative and a moderate
multicollinearity exists between these varjables. Such a relationship is predicted because
agriculture is a percentage of GDP. These two explanatory variables are applied
separately in the first and the second models, so this correlation is not a problem for the
analysis.    This section describes the results from running the fixed-effect models. The
first model used Western-oriented voting share as dependent variable (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2. Estimated results of the first fixed-effect model with Western-oriented parties
(loans, GDP, and fertility)
Variables
Parametercoefficient
Standard Error t Value Pr >  ltl
Intercept 60.1027 9.4338 6.37 <-0001
Lag(Loans) -0.2079 0.0892 -2.33 0.0250
GDP 0.0017 0.0017 0.95 0.3472
Lag(Fertility) -0.8885 3.0569 -0.29 0.7728
Dl 24.4823 8.7070 2.81 0.0077
D2 24.6969 7.8406 3.15 0.0031
D3 29.4025 8.0455 3.65 0.0008
D4 2:2 .LJ en 8.1341 2.73 0.0095
D5 15.2437 9.6883 1.57 0.1237
D6 16.5593 8.1 197 2.04 0.0482
D8 3 3 .1667 6.8598 4.83 <.0001
D9 29.8557 7.5952 3.93 0.0003
D10 33.7975 7.2630 4.65 <.0001
Dll -26.3790 8.6794 -3.04 0.0042
D12 7.9133 8.1377 0.97 0.3368
D13 2:J .9407 9.2564 3.02 0.0045
D14 47.5618 9.7191 4.89 <.0001
D15 26.9425 8.3674 3.22 0.0026
D16 22.5152 15.0198 I.50 0.1419
The exogenous variable, loans in the pre-election year, had a strong negative
significance at the 0.05  statistically significant level (t-value equals -2.33).  The negative
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sign supported our assumption about the external pressure in the year before the election`
which means that less the US aid led to increasing the pressure before the election and
pushed the governments to choose Western-oriented policies for development.  Such
government strategies led to increases in the voting for Western-oriented parties in the
election. Other explana.tory variables, GDP and fertility in the pre-election year, were not
significant.   Almost all of the dummy variables were significant at the 0.05  statistically
significant level, except for the dummy variables of  Russia (t statistic equals 0.97),the
Czech Republic (t statistic equals  1.57), and Slovenia (t statistic equals  I.5), and
positively related to intercept. Only Ukraine had a negative estimated coefficient,
meaning that it negatively accounted for the intercept. Instead of GDP per capjta, the first
model included agriculture in the year before the election in addition to fertility and loans
in the pre-election year. All three variables influenced the dependent one (Table 4.3).
Loans per capita were negatively related to election outcomes at the 0.05  statistically
signiflcant level. Therefore, fewer loans led to increasing pressure on governments, and,
ultimately, Western-oriented voting. Agriculture before the election had a positive
influence on the voting (significance at the 0.05 statistically significant level).  The
increase of agriculture in GDP raised the Western-oriented voting share, because the new
class of farmers was interested in the private property on the land. Fertility in the pre-
election year and voting negatively related to each other with 0.05  statistically significant
level.  Western-oriented election outcomes fell with higher fertility ratings. Almost all
dummies were strongly significant, except Ukraine. All proxies had a positive sign, which
demonstrated that all countries positively accounting to the base country-Albania.
The second model is an equation with the share of traditional parties as a
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dependent variable (Tables 4.4 and 4.5).
Table 4.3. Estimated results of the first fixed-effect model with Western-oriented parties
(loans, agriculture, and fertility)
Variables
Parametercoefficient
Standard Error t Value Pr  >  ltl
Intercept 37.0623 11.6579 3.18 0.0029
Lag(Loans) -0.1714 0.0752 -2.28 0.0282
Lag(Agriculture) I.0813 0.3497 3.09 0.0037
Lag(Fertility) -7.7819 3.2545 -2.39 0.0217
Dl 49.2395 10.0032 4.92 <.0001
D2 50.0354 10.2687 4.87 <.0001
D3 S5.fJJ72 10.1162 5.44 <.0001
D4 55.0992 11.3001 4.88 <.0001
D5 49.0348 1 1.4462 4.28 0.0001
D6 49.2941 11.5771 4.26 0.0001
D8 50.4105 8.2250 6 . 1 `J <.0001
D9 44.8020 8.3418 5.37 <.0001
D10 37.5925 6.6971 5,61 <.0001
Dll -11.0973 9.3361 -1.19 0.2418
D12 36.4413 I  1.2614 3.24 0.0025
D13 60.0275 11.3697 5.28 <.0001
D14 62.3071 10.1619 6.13 <.0001
D15 53.5996 9.8710 5.43 <.0001
D16 60.6983 11.1083 5.46 <.0001
Firstly, we analyzed the second model with fertility,loans, and GDP (Table 4.4).
Loans in the year before the election is significant at the 0. I  statistically significant level.
The loans before the election year positively impacts the voting behavior for the
traditional parties. Thus, fewer loans per capita led to less support for traditional
platforms. Neither GDP nor fertility showed significance in this model` so those factors
did not impact the election outcomes. All dummy variables illustrated a negative
signiflcance, so, in this equation, all countries negatively related to the base country.
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Table 4.4. Estimated results of second fixed-effect model with traditional-oriented parties
(loans, GDP, and fertility)
Variables
Parametercoefficient
Standard Error t Value Pr  >  \t\
Intercept 44.5205 8.1091 5.49 <.0001
Lag(Loans) 0.1505 0.0767 1.96 0.0569
GDP 0.0003 0.0015 0.18 0.8595
Lag(Fertility) -2.2102 2.6277 -0.84 0.4054
D1 -36.8870 7.4844 -4.93 <.0001
D2 -38.5899 6.7397 -5.73 <.0001
D3 -42.4841 6.9158 -6.14 <.0001
D4 -32.2284 6.9919 -4.61 <.0001
D5 -29.4463 8.3279 -3.54 0. 001  1
D6 -28.2253 6.9796 -4.04 0.0002
D8 -41.9112 5.8966                         -7.11 <.0001
D9 -40.7879 6.5287 -6.25 <.0001
D10 -42.2652 6.2432 -6.77 <.0001
Dl1 -19.1597 7.4607 -2.57 0.0142
D12 -21.5002 6.9950 -3.07 0.0038
D13 -39.4244 7.9566 -4.95 <.0001
D14 -48.7129 8.3544 -5.83 <.0001
D15 -39.7269 7.1925 -5.52 <. 000 1
D16 -46.0558 12.9107 -3.57 0.0010
With a different set of independent variables (i.e., loans, fertility and agriculture),
the second model demonstrated following results (Table 4.5). Two explanatory factors
became significant at the 0.05  statistically significant level..   loans and agriculture in the
pre-election year. Loans had a positive sign, so less aid caused people to vote for
traditional parties. Agriculture had a negative estimated coefficient, which means that a
lower percent of agriculture in GDP led to increasing traditional voting. Fertility did not
impact the results in this model. All dummies showed strong signjficance and a negative
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influence on the outcomes, indicating that the dummy variables were negatively related to
the basic country.
Table 4.5. Estimated results for the second model with traditional-oriented  parties
(loans, agriculture, and fertility)
Variables
Parameter Standard
t Value Pr >  ltl
coefficient Error
Intercept 66.4227 9.9953 6.65 <.0001
Lag(Loans) 0.1513 0.0645 2.35 0.0241
Lag(Agriculture) -0.8865 0.2999 -2.96 0.0053
Lag(Fertility) 2.5212 2.7904 0.90 0.3718
D1 -53.8984 8.5766 -6.28 <. 0001
D2 -57.5856 8.8042 -6.54 <.0001
D3 -60.9392 8.6735 -7.03 <.0001
D4 -55.3200 9.6885 -5.71 <.0001
D5 -51.6077 9.8138 -5.26 <.0001
D6 -51.7524 9.9261 -5 .21 <.0001
D8 -55.5302 7.0520 -7.87 <.0001
D9 -52,.6f)J9 7.1521 -7.37 <.0001
Dlo -46.3552 5.7420 -8.07 <.0001
Dll -31.9590 8.0046 -3.99 0.0003
D12 -43 .1896 9.6554 -4.47 <.0001
D13 -61.1504 9.7482 -6.27 <.0001
D14 -62.9832 8.7126 -7.23 <.0001
D15 -57.7165 8.4632 -6.82 <.0001
D16 -65.4814 9.5241 -6.88 <.0001
To evaluate the impact of significant factors on the election outcomes, we
calculated the elasticity measures. Elasticity of the independent variables (except the
dummy variables) was computed based on the means of the independent and dependent
variables.  The calculation of the elasticity can be represented as:
c =  parameter * Dependentvariab
dependenlvariable
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When the explanatory variables were significant, the above formula was used to
compute the elasticity of  loans, fertility, and share of agriculture for the SWP and STP
equations (Tables 4.6 and 4.7).  We applied the formula to the two models with the second
set of independent variables.
Table. 4.6. The elasticity calculation for the significant independent variables (loans,
agriculture, and fertility) in the first model
Variables
Parameter
Mean of X
Mean of Y
Elasticitycoefficient (SWP)
Loans -2.28 14.73 82.3 -0.41
Agriculture 3.09 14.02 82.3 0.53
Fertility -2.39 1.58 82.3 -0.05
The elasticity of loans demonstrated that decreasing the loans per capita by  1
percent in the pre-election year led to the increasing of the western oriented voting by
0.41  percent.  The elasticity of agriculture showed that a  1  percent increase  in the  share of
agriculture in GDP in the pre-election year led to a 0.53 percent increase in, the share of
western parties in the election.   Additionally, a 1  percent increase in the fertility rate
before the election led to a 0.05 percent decrease in the western share of voting    The
second model gave us the following elasticity' values (Table 4.7).
Table.  4.7.  The elasticity calculation for the  significant independent variables (loans and
agriculture) in the second model
Variables
Parametercoefficient
Mean of X Mean of Y (STP) Elasticity
1,oans 2.35 14.73 10.0 3.46
Agriculture -2.96 14.02 10.0 -4.15
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According to Table 4.7, a  1  percent reduction in the number of  loans per capita
led to a 3.46 percent reduction in the share of traditional  parties.  When the  share of
agriculture increased by  I  percent, the traditional voting declined by 4.15 percent.
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
This chapter summarizes the problem and objectives, the methodology` and the
econometrical results of the analyzed models. Additionally, the limitations and
recommendations for further research are discussed.
Summary
For central and eastern European countries, the years from  1990-2001  became a
transition period in their development, bringing major reforms in their economic and
political systems. This period was characterized by the appearance of many different
political parties that can be divided into two categories according to their political
ideologies:  Western and traditional. The purpose of this study was to analyze the
relationships between parliamentary election outcomes and economic, political and socio-
demographic factors. Our assumption was that the outcomes of the parliamentary
elections depended on four independent variables:  GDP per capita, agriculture, loans per
capita, and fertility.
The general objective was to determine how the four economic, political, and
socio-demographic factors impacted the election outcomes. The two specific objectives of
the  study included the following:  (1) to investigate the economic,  political, and socio-
demographic factors that impact election outcomes in economies in transition in central
and eastern European countries; (2) to identify how such factors affect the success of
Western-oriented and traditional-oriented parties in parliamentary elections.
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We began by creating two fixed-effect models (Kennedy,  1996). Two different
models investigated the effect of  the exogenous variables of GDP per capita, loans per
capita, fertility and agriculture on the voting shares of Western and traditional parties.
Data frc>m sixteen countries from  1990-2001  were analyzed in the models. The database
was created from Bugajski (2002) and the University of Essex for shares of the Western
and traditional oriented parties, from the USAID for loans per capita, from the World
Bank for GDP, population, agriculture, and fertility.
The investigation of the first model showed that only loans were consistently
significant in both equations and impacted the outcomes of the parliamentary election for
both parties. We concluded that fewer US aid led to increases in Western-oriented voting`
and to decreases in traditional-oriented voting. Additionally, the share of agriculture in
GDP demonstrated a positive influence on the voting for Western parties and a  negative
influence on the voting for traditional parties.    Fertility illustrated a stable significance
only in the second model with the second set of independent variables(loans, agriculture,
fertility), which supported our hypothesis that people with fewer children prefer to vote
for Western parties.  Dummy variab[es demonstrated strong impacts on election outcomes
in the traditional and Western party voting models. According to this study, it is possible
to conclude that parliamentary elections in central and eastern European countries
depended on the political and socio-demographic factors from  1990-2001.
The elasticity calculation measured the impact of factors on the voting` so
decreasing the loans per capita by  I  percent in the pre-election year led to an increase in
Western-oriented voting by 0.41  percent. When the share of agriculture in GDP in the
pre-election year increased by  1  percent, the share of western parties in the election was
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larger by 0.53 percent. Additionally, increased fertility rates before the election led to
decreased shares in   Western voting by 0.05 percent.
According to the results of the second model, the reduced number of loans per
capita (by  1  percent) led to decreasing shares of traditional parties by 3.46 percent. When
the share of agriculture increased by  1  percent, the traditional  voting decreased by 4.15
percent.
Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research
The data collection process was subject to several  limitations.  Dividing all  parties
into categories required identifying their economic platforms.   That information was
usually found on the websites of the parties, but some sites did not use the English
language, which made translation difficult.   Consequently, we needed to find additional
information about them in books andjournal articles. In addition, we identified a large
number of small parties (e.g„ with voting shares of one percent) that did not have their
own sites; therefore, we excluded those parties from our analysis and placed them in a
third category titled, "Other."   However,  since those groups had received votes`  the total
voting shares in our results for Western-oriented parties and traditional parties did not
equal  loo percent.
Additional difficulties emerged because most of the parties had changed their
1990-2001  political platforms and status one or more times during the seven-year period
(e.g., some joined to new coalitions or left one coalition to join another one).   Therefore,
our results might have been affected by inaccuracies in our estimations of party platforms,
Also, our data was missing some values in the level of fertility, agriculture, nominal GDP
per capita,  and loans per capita.   Therefore, we calculated the missing observations f`or
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fertility, agriculture, and nominal GDP as an average value for the specific country for the
analyzed period. The missing values of loans per capita were equaled to zero.
Finally, a limited degree of freedom and difference in the period of elections for
each country caused us to use one-way fixed-affect models instead of two-wa}'  fixed-
effect models. We recommend that this study be expanded by analyzing the outcomes of
presidential elections compared to parliamentary elections because the policies of the
countries depended on both types.   Further research is also needed to fully understand the
factors that impacted the outcomes of presidential elections in relation to their effect on
the voting for parties in power compared to their opponents.
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44APPENDIXA
Name of the
Year of election
Share of the western Share of the
country parties, % traditional parties, %
Estonia 1992 87.5 0
1995 90 5.9
1999 85.1 13.4
Latvia 1990 89.7 0
1993 91.9 0
1995 82.5 5.6
1998 81.6 12.9
I.,ithuania 1992 93.5 0
1996 85.9 0
;
2000 93.8 0
Poland 1991 89.8 0
1993 96.1 0
1997 62.4 33.8
2001 93.7 5.6
Czech Republic 1990 75.2 18
1992 78.6 14.5
1996 84.9 1].7
1998 87.2 11
Slovakia 1990 79.I 13.3
1992 78.6 14
1994 83.1 10.I
1998 79.5 18.8
Albania 1991 40.I 56.2
1992 68.I 30.1
1996 77.2 21.9
1997 40.1 55.2
2001 49.7 45.1
Bulgaria 1990 97.4 0
1991 86.3 3.9
1994 90.1 2.9
1997 92.6 1.3
45
Name of the
Year of election
Share of the western Share of the
Country parties, % traditional parties, %
Bulgaria 2001 92.6 0
Romania 1990 92.6 0
1992 87.9 3.2
1996 85.4 5.8
2000 93.3 0.9
Moldova 1994 91.8 0
1998 90.5 0
2001 87.4 0
Ukraine 1994 15.9 12.7
1998 50 33.3
Russia 1993 82 12.4
1995 61.4 26.8
1999 62.8 27.1
Hungary 1990 89.7 3.7
1994 92.4 3.2
1998 95.I 4
Bosnia-Herzegovina
1996 loo 0
1998 85 12
2000 81.4 4.9
Croatia 1990 66.1 26.5
1992 85.2 0
1995 98.9 0
2000 96.7 0
Slovenia 1990 100 0
1992 87.1 0
1996 93.9 0
2000 96.3 0
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